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Abstract
Reputation management schemes have recently emerged as a mechanism for im-
proving trust and security in peer-to-peer networks. A new entrant in a network with
reputation management can either be given the benefit of doubt and be treated like
a trusted (or semi-trusted) peer until it acts maliciously or it can be assumed to be
untrusted and have to earn the trust of others. The former case provides an incentive
for misbehaving peers to cast off their old identity and assume a new one regularly.
The latter case presents the problem of new peers being unable to bootstrap and to
gain a foothold in the network.
In this paper, we present a mechanism in which existing peers can choose to
“lend” part of their reputation to new peers that they know in order to give them a
start. This mechanism mirrors the real world where a reference or an introduction
often gives one a foothold into an otherwise closed group. If the new peer behaves
well, the old peer is rewarded for adding value to the group and if the new peer
misbehaves the old peer loses the reputation they lent. In this way, existing peers
have a stake in introducing new peers into the network and get a return on their
investment for introducing honest peers.
3
1 Introduction
In a cooperative peer-to-peer (p2p) system participating nodes (peers) are expected to
share their resources, such as storage, computing power, bandwidth, and content, in ex-
change for access to resources provided by other nodes. The goal is to increase the overall
utility of the entire system.
The reality, however, is not so idyllic: the human users behind the nodes may follow
personal agendas, and the nodes they control may deviate from the expected behavior.
Misbehavior, or rather behavior that does not conform to system goals, can be classified
in two main categories [2].
Rational users may be selsh, and modify their nodes in order to increase their personal
utility. Here, personal utility may be informally defined as the ratio between the remote
resources consumed and the local resources shared.
Malicious users, on the other hand, may be guided by different notion of utility, or behave
completely irrationally. For example, record companies that sell music CDs may be in-
terested in disrupting the functioning of a file sharing network, for example using denial
of service (DoS) attacks, or by inserting bogus files in the system.
The problems caused by these two types of “disobedient” users are of different scales and
levels of severity. While malicious attacks are more dangerous, they require significantly
more technical expertise, time and effort from a node; behaving selfishly is much easier;
for example, in KaZaA it is sufficient to set the participation level to Master permanently
and a hacked version called KaZaaLite does precisely this. Therefore, it may be fair to
assume that the number of malicious agents in a p2p system is likely to be far smaller
than the number of freeriders.
The problem of implementing distributed systems in the presence of malicious users has
been extensively studied in the past [2, 4]; theoretical results exist on the solvability of
specific problems, like consensus, in the presence of a (limited) number of malicious
nodes. Furthermore, traditional security techniques may be used to deal with specific
kind of attacks; for example, cryptographic signatures for ensuring integrity of data while
in transit.
More recently, the use of reputation management systems has emerged as a possible
mechanism to enforce fair sharing of resources and honesty in p2p systems where a
large fraction of nodes may be guided by selfish interest. Different techniques exist,
ranging from simple schemes such as tit-for-tat in BitTorrent [5] to complex distributed
schemes such as EigenTrust [11] to credit-based schemes such as Scrivener [12]. In all
these systems, the underlying principle remains the same: decide if a peer is trustwor-
thy/cooperative based on its past behavior (honesty/willingness to share its own resources)
and provide services to the peer based on how trustworthy/cooperative the peer is; there-
fore creating an incentive for positive behavior.
In this paper, we focus on a specific problem of reputation that has been poorly analyzed
before: the treatment given to new peers when they enter the system. It is in the interests
of the system to encourage new entrants into the system as it increases the resources
available for sharing and increases the usefulness of the system. At the same time, the
system must guard against admitting too many selfish or malicious peers as they can drain
system resources without contributing anything in turn and endanger system stability.
The treatment of new peers is dependent on the reputation model of the system to a large
extent. In a system like complaints-based trust [1], it is assumed that the vast majority
of peers are trustworthy. The system only records negative feedback and a peer lacking
feedback, as is the case with a new peer, is assumed to be trustworthy. However, this
kind of system is open to exploitation as a node may discard its old identity when it has
collected enough negative feedback and assume a new identity and start afresh.
Another option is to use only positive feedback, where a new entrant has the minimum
possible reputation. This model makes it difficult to distinguish between a new peer and
a dishonest or non-cooperative peer. If existing peers choose to interact only with peers
with a minimum level of positive feedback, a new peer may thus find itself frozen out of
the group or find itself being mistreated by older trusted peers.
The third option is to count both positive and negative feedback [9, 11]. In this model
a new peer enters in the middle of the spectrum and is treated at par with a peer who
behaves honestly and dishonestly roughly the same proportion of time. However, if we
assume that a large majority of peers are trustworthy, a new peer again runs the risk of
being marginalized as older peers may not wish to risk being cheated by interacting with
a peer whose reputation is significantly lower than the group average.
In this paper we present a novel technique to enable new peers to surmount the problem
of “initiation” into the community. We draw inspiration from the real world where one
is often initiated into a group by an existing member. For example, an application for
graduate school or a faculty position usually requires recommendation letters from the
applicant’s professors. The reputation of the existing member is reflected on the new
member and other members accord the new member some benefit of doubt. In this respect,
our system is not very different from systems like BitTorrent [5] and Scrivener [12] that
give a small amount of initial credit to each new peer (or reserve a proportion of resources
for altruistic purposes) in order to get them started in the system.
The difference is that in our system each new peer does not automatically get an initial
credit as in the above systems but is instead accorded credit only if the peer gains a recom-
mender. The initial credit granted is contingent on the reputation of the recommender. The
motivation behind this approach is that peers in the system are more likely to introduce
cooperative peers. Our system also differs in that it does not maintain a complex system
of credits and debits among peers to make resource decisions. Instead we rely on an un-
derlying reputation management system to make these decisions. The only credit offered
is to new peers by the recommender for the purposes of getting started. Subsequently, the
new node forms its reputation through normal activity in the p2p system.
A potential criticism of our proposed approach is that it is open to an attack where one
member of a group of colluding peers enters the system and behaves honestly to accumu-
late reputation. It then recommends the other malicious peer into the group. Since these
new peers start with a high reputation, they are able to interact with all the other peers in
the system and cause significant damage. We tackle this problem by obligating the rec-
ommender to put some of its own reputation at risk when it recommends a new member.
If the recommended member behaves honestly (fairly) the recommender gets the staked
reputation back along with some reward for bringing a useful member into the group. If
the new peer is malicious (freerider) the recommender loses the portion of its reputation
that it risked.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the system
model and the adversarial model. Section 3 discusses design and implementation issues.
We present our experimental results in Section 4. We discuss related work in Section 5
and Section 6 concludes.
2 System Model
The objective of our scheme is to encourage honest peers to join the p2p community as
they will increase total group utility while keeping out freeriders and potentially mali-
cious peers. All peers in the network form a reputation on the basis of their behavior in
their interactions with other peers in the community. We use the ROCQ [8] reputation
management system to compute reputation values for peers. In principle, the ROCQ al-
gorithm can be applied to both unstructured and structured overlay networks. We assume
the existence of a structured overlay that uses distributed hash tables for routing and for
selecting score managers that keep track of all feedback pertaining to a peer.
Before each transaction, the peer that is about to provide resources asks for the reputation
of the requesting peer. If the requesting peer has a high reputation, implying that it is
cooperative, the peer provides the resources requested. If not, it denies the request. At the
end of each transaction both partners send feedback to the other partner’s score managers
who use this information to construct the peers’ reputation. If the system is functioning
as desired, the reputation value of all cooperative peers should tend to  whereas that of
uncooperative peers should tend to zero. The calculation of reputation values by the score
managers depends not only on the opinions reported by the peers but also on credibility
ans quality values. A detailed explanation of the ROCQ algorithm can be found in [7, 8].
Bootstrap. In our system each new entrant is assumed to start with a reputation value of 
which is equivalent to the new entrant being uncooperative. Since, the reputation value of
a peer is used to decide whether another peer will interact with it, a value of zero signifies
that no other peer in the system will wish to interact with it. As a result, the new entrant
is denied the opportunity to consume any resources in the system.
The only method by which a new peer can get started in the system is by getting an
“introduction” from an existing peer. This “introduction” serves as the basis for creating
the new entrant’s initial reputation and allows it to use the resources provided by the
system subject to some constraints. The new entrant’s behavior is monitored closely and
if it is uncooperative its reputation value drops accordingly. If it continues to behave in
this manner the initial credit eventually runs out and the peer is gradually excluded from
the system. This exclusion is implicit and not explicit as a peer with zero reputation will
not find any other peer willing to interact with it.
Impact on introducer. The peer that introduces a new entrant is termed the introducer
and is responsible for the consequences of the introduction. If the peer it has introduced
becomes a productive member of the community and adds value to the system, the in-
troducer is appropriately rewarded. On the other hand, if the introducer was wrong in its
judgment and introduces a misbehaving peer into the system, the introducer is penalized.
Multiple introduction requests. In order to prevent a new peer from bombarding the
system with requests for introduction, a waiting period  must elapse between the re-
quest for introduction and the response, regardless of whether the introducer decides to
introduce the new peer or not. If the introducer decides to introduce the new peer, it waits
for  time units before contacting its own score manager. It sends a signed message
to its score managers telling them to deduct the lent amount 
	 from its reputation.
The introduction request carries the identity of both the introducer and the new peer to
whom this amount is being lent as well as a unique id to prevent duplicate requests. These
score managers then send a message to each of the score managers of the new peer telling
them to credit the new peer with this amount. Since each score manager of the introducer
sends messages to each score manager of the new peer, redundancy is introduced in the
system in case a score manager crashes before being able to contact the new peer’s score
managers.
If the request is denied, the introducer sends a message to the new peer at the end of the
wait period  informing it. This protocol ensures that the new peer cannot send any more
introduction requests before the waiting period is over. The new peer does not know the
introducer’s decision before the waiting period  is over and if it sends an introduction
request to a second peer in the system before receiving a response from the first peer,
it is possible that both of them may agree to introduce this peer. In this case, the score
managers of the new peer would receive two introductions for the same peer. They realize
that the new peer is trying to gain unfair advantage and therefore reduce its reputation to
zero as a result and may flag it as a malicious peer.
Attack Model. We assume that the attacks that can be launched by a node are limited
to 1) behaving uncooperatively (freeriding), and 2) furnishing incorrect or corrupted con-
tent. This is in contrast to the more general byzantine model that has been proposed in
the literature [2,14] where a malicious peer may attempt to disrupt the system by not for-
warding requests, trying to change network topology, launching denial-of-service attacks
etc.
It should be pointed out here that the reputation management solution being used, ROCQ,
is designed to counter precisely the two types of attacks we mention here [10]. More
general malicious attacks cannot be dealt with by reputation management systems in
our knowledge and solutions to these kinds of attacks have been proposed by other re-
searchers [3] and can be used in addition to ROCQ.
3 Design and Implementation
We implemented our reputation lending scheme in Java reusing the reputation manage-
ment code of ROCQ. We implemented a discrete even simulator where exactly one re-
source transaction is scheduled in each unit of simulation time. We do not model trans-
mission delays or losses and all messages are delivered instantly to the recipient using
distributed hash tables. It should be pointed out that the the arrival of new nodes does
influence DHT-based routing as the score managers assigned to a peer change over time.
However, by using multiple score managers this impact is significantly reduced as was
demonstrated in [7].
The requester is chosen at random from the list of peers in the system whereas the respon-
dent is chosen according to the network topology. We model two different topologies: 1)
random and 2) scale-free. In the random topology, all nodes are equally likely to be cho-
sen as the potential respondent. In the scale-free topology, the probability of a node being
chosen as the potential respondent is distributed according to a power-law.
A peer decides whether or not to respond to a request from another peer on the basis of the
reputation value of the requesting peer. A high reputation value of the requester implies
that the system considers the requester to be cooperative. In our system, a correctly func-
tioning peer will respond to a peer requesting the service with a probability that is equal
to the requesting peer’s reputation  . Therefore, all peers have an incentive to increase
their reputation value as that increases their chances of being served. The reputation of a
peer,  , corresponds to the proportion of time the peer has offered good service. Hence,
a peer is served the same proportion of time that it serves other peers in the network.
After the transaction is completed both parties involved in the transaction report their
level of satisfaction to the score managers of its transaction partners. If satisfied, they
send a value of  to the score manager and if not they send a value of  . In our model an
uncooperative peer would always send a value of  for its partners in order to reduce the
impact on its own reputation.
New peer arrival: The arrival of new peers is modeled as a Poisson process with the
arrival rate equal to  . Of these, cooperative peers arrive at the rate  and uncooperative
peers arrive at rate  . Hence the proportion of arriving peers that are uncooperative is

ﬁﬀﬃﬂ
ﬀ 
. The arriving peer choses a potential introducer from the set of peers that are
already in the system. The introducer is also chosen depending on network topology as
discussed above.
If the potential introducer decides to introduce the new peer into the network, it lends a
portion !	 of its reputation to the new entrant. Introducing a new peer carries a cost
as a request from the introducer to another node in the system will now be denied with
Parameter Name Description Default Value
numInit Initial Number of Peers in the System 500
numTrans Number of Transactions 500,000
numSM Number of Score Managers 6
 Rate of new peer arrival in (simulation time units) 0.01

 Fraction of new entrants who are uncooperative 0.25

 Fraction of cooperative peers who are naive introducers 0.3
"
#$# Percentage of selective peer introductions that are incorrect 10%
topology Network topology (Random, Powerlaw) Powerlaw
 Waiting period for Introductions 1000
auditTrans Number of transactions after which a new node is audited 20
%	 Amount of reputation an introducer gives up 0.1
&#'( Reward for introducing a cooperative peer 0.02
&*)ﬃ#$$+() Minimum Reputation required for introducing a peer ,.-0/21(436547 8!9:
	;(<
Table 1: Simulation parameters
an additional probability =	 . But the introducer can recoup its reputation in time by
behaving cooperatively with other peers. In addition, if the introduced peer is a productive
member of the community the introducer is returned this lent reputation and given a small
reward.
Types of introducers. We model two kinds of introducers. “Naive” introducers are indis-
criminate and will give an introduction to any new entrant that asks for one. “Selective”
introducers are more discriminating and only give introductions to peers that they believe
will behave in a cooperative fashion. However, the selective introducer also make mis-
takes in their judgment and introduce a small percentage
"
(#># of the dishonest nodes that
ask them for an introduction.
Performance audit. The performance of the new entrant is audited after it has been part
of the system for some time and has had opportunities to interact with other peers. After
the new peer completed auditTrans number of transactions its score managers will audit
its performance. If the performance is deemed satisfactory based on its reputation value,
the introducer is given back the reputation that it had lent 
	;(< along with a small reward
%#$( for introducing an honest peer to the system. This is communicated to the score
managers of the introducing peer who update the reputation value of the introducer subject
to the reputation not exceeding  . If the performance of the new peer is unsatisfactory,
the introducer loses the lent reputation and no message to its score managers is sent. The
score managers of the new peer also reduce the stored reputation of the new entrant by
introAmt subject to a minimum of  .
We do not allow peers whose reputation goes below a certain threshold 
*) #'$+) to intro-
duce anyone into the system. This prevents peers with low reputations – i.e. uncoopera-
tive peers or new peers – from trying to introduce new peers in the network. By keeping
%*) #'>+() greater than !	;( we also prevent peer reputation value from going below zero.
4 Experimental Results
In this section we present simulation results to evaluate the performance of our scheme.
Initially, all nodes in the p2p network are assumed to be honest and cooperative. Of these
nodes, a fraction

 are naive introducers and the remainder are selective introducers. We
also assume that all new peers that are uncooperative are naive introducers. Among the
cooperative new peers,

 of these are naive introducers and the rest are selective. Each
experiment is repeated ? times and the results shown are the average obtained over the
? runs.
4.1 Number of Uncooperative Peers Peers vs. Community Growth
In this experiment we compare the number of uncooperative peers in the community
as a proportion of the total population. We start with a community of 5@0 cooperative
users. New peers arrive in the system at a rate ABC3C according to a Poisson arrival
process. We assume that a new peer will chose a random peer in the system to ask for
an introduction subject to the topology. As mentioned above

 of the original peers in
the system are naive and introduce all new peer that make an introduction request into the
system.
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Figure 1: Growth in Number of uncooperative vs. cooperative peers
Figure 1 shows the increase in number of uncooperative peers as a function of the number
of cooperative peers in the system. We find that the number of uncooperative peers in the
system increases linearly with the number of cooperative peers in the system. However,
the slope of the increase is significantly less than C3D0D one would expect if all peers were
let into the system. Since

 is C3E805 , an uncooperative peer tries to enter the system for ev-
ery three cooperative peers who try. This is because the selective peers deny introductions
to 1FG0=H
"
(#$# IKJ of the uncooperative peers that seek introductions from them.
We also find that the rate at which the number of uncooperative peers in the system in-
creases is independent of the network topology. The same amount of uncooperative peers
manage to enter the system in a scale-free network as in a random network. We therefore
use the scale-free topology for all our remaining experiments.
While the number of uncooperative peers in the system at the end of this experiment
is large (about LM805 ) this is much less than the number that would have been allowed in
without introductions being required. This experiment ran for 5N0000 simulation time
units. Since OPQ43EC , the total number of nodes trying to enter the system is 5N00 of
which R8@5@ are uncooperative. We also see that about D0S0@ cooperative peers are in the
system at the end of the experiment. This is less than the expected LT8@5@ peers (as there
were 5N0 cooperative peers in the system originally). The DM5@ peers that were turned
away include peers who sought an introduction from one of the new entrants who was
uncooperative or from one of the naive cooperative peers who lost all of their reputation
through inaccurate introductions.
Success Rate. An important measure of our system performance is to look at the propor-
tion of decisions to serve a request or not taken by a cooperative peer that are correct. The
ROCQ reputation mechanism is designed to discourage uncooperative behavior as peer
with a low reputation are much less likely to be served by another peer in the network.
We computed our decision success rate as:
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 is the number requests from cooperative nodes that are accepted and
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is the number requests from uncooperative nodes that are requested. We found that when
introductions were not required and all nodes were allowed in the system, the success
rate was S@fC3gGDMJ whereas when introductions were required the success rate was S0f43EhM5@J .
These success rates were achieved in ROCQ by Garg et al. in [7,8] as long as cooperative
peers are in a majority. Adding the requirement that new entrants be introduced does not
change the success rate of ROCQ by a significant amount. We conclude that the introducer
requirement is compatible with the ROCQ reputation management scheme.
Peer Reputations. We now look at how peer reputations evolve with time. In Figure 2 we
compare the reputations of cooperative peers for different peer arrival rates  over time.
As before, the experiment runs for 5@0@00 simulation time units and default values for all
other parameters are used (See Table 1). We do not plot the reputation of uncooperative
peers as it remains very low ( GCikj or less) for all arrival rates. We retrieve the reputation
values for all cooperative peers every 5@@0 time units and compute the average. This is
then plotted in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Reputation of Cooperative Peers with Time
We find that the average reputation of cooperative peers (including both peers that were
originally part of the system and new entrants) remains more or less constant with re-
spect to time for all values of  . The only exception to this are high arrival rates
mlon;C3M847pC368Rq . In these cases the system is overwhelmed by the new entrants. As
each new entrant asks for an introduction the reputation of cooperative peers is quickly
depleted to a minimum. Thereafter, peer reputations recover as peers interact with each
other and cooperative peers give each other positive feedback. This steady state is then
maintained for the duration of the experiment.
4.2 Proportion of Naive Introducers
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Figure 3: Number of Cooperative and Uncooperative Peers in System with Proportion of
Introducers that are Naive
The proportion of introducers in the system that are naive has a strong influence on the
number of uncooperative nodes that are admitted to the system. In Figure 3 we plot
the number of cooperative and uncooperative nodes in the system at the end of 5@0@00
simulation time units. Again, rs43EC for this experiment.
We find that as the proportion of naive introducers increases, the number of cooperative
peers in the system decreases from LM8@0 to D0h00 and the number of uncooperative peers
increases from ?805 to a little over ?00 . We can make two significant observations here.
Some uncooperative peers enter the system even when all the peers are selective. This is
due to the selective peer error rate
"
#$# which means that ?MJ of uncooperative peers that
ask for introductions are successful. R805 is indeed ?0J of the total number of uncooper-
ative peers that try to enter the system.
We also find that even when all the peers are naive, the number of uncooperative peers
admitted to the system is less than R805@ . Every time a naive peer introduces an uncooper-
ative new peers, it loses =	;(< of its reputation. Even though this can be recouped through
behaving cooperatively in the network, this is not sufficient. The reputation of some of the
naive introducers falls below the threshold required to introduce a new peer in the system
and hence new peers are turned away without an introduction. This lack of introductions
affects cooperative new entrants equally but that is to be expected as all introducers in the
system are naive.
4.3 Amount of Reputation Risked
We now consider the effectiveness our introduction requirement policy as the amount of
reputation lent by the introducer changes. Each simulation runs for 5@@000 time units
and we repeat each run 10 times and average the results. The reward for introducing a
cooperative member is fixed at 8@0J of the reputation that is lent ( t#'usC3E8v9w!	;(xI . All
other parameters take the default values as noted in Table 1.
In Figure 4 we find that as =	 increases, the number of new entrants who are turned
away increases. We can conclude this since the number of total peers in the system shows
a clear decrease. The number of peers admitted remains more or less the same for y	;({z
C3|R5 but starts decreasing once =	 becomes larger. Peers can be refused an introduction
due to one of two reasons. Either the introducer does not have sufficient reputation to
lend to the new peer or the new peer is uncooperative and the introducer is selective and
decides to withhold the introduction. In Figure 4 we further see that the number of peers
being refused entry by selective introducers remains the same. This is to be expected as
the proportion of new peers that are uncooperative is not changing. On the other hand,
as the amount of reputation being lent upon introduction increases, the number of peers
refused entry because their introducer did not have enough reputation increases.
We also see in Figure 5 that the relative proportions cooperative/uncooperative nodes
does not change significantly. Therefore, we conclude that increasing y	;(< beyond C3|R5
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prevents removes too much reputation from the system. And nodes are prevented from
entering the system without distinguishing between cooperative and uncooperative nodes.
4.4 Proportion of Freeriding New Entrants
We now examine how peer introductions are affected by the change in the percentage of
new entrants that are uncooperative. Figure 6 shows that as the percentage of uncoopera-
tive peers increases among the new entrants, the total number of cooperative peers left in
the system at the end of the experiment, decreases. This is to be expected as fewer coop-
erative peers are trying to enter the system. This curve is almost a straight line with the
number of cooperative peers in the system decreasing from 5eLM0 when all new entrants
are cooperative to 5@0 when all new entrants are uncooperative. The former number is
5NL00 because the remaining G0 peers are still waiting to be admitted into the system
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when the simulation terminates.
The number of uncooperative peers entering the system does not increase linearly and
is bounded at about ?0@ uncooperative peers. This illustrates how our reputation lend-
ing scheme is successful in preventing the system from being swamped by uncooperative
peers. As the graph illustrates, part of this can be attributed to selective peers refusing in-
troductions to uncooperative peers. As the percentage of uncooperative entrants increase,
an increasingly important role is also played by the naive and uncooperative peers losing
the reputation they lent to other uncooperative peers. Thus, they have no more reputation
to lend and cannot introduce any more uncooperative peers.
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4.5 Discussion
We have evaluated the performance of our reputation lending scheme over a variety of
conditions. We show that our system is successful in reducing the number of uncoopera-
tive peers that enter the system without significantly decreasing the number of cooperative
peers that enter as long as we use appropriate parameters such as amount of reputation lent
to a new entrant and as long as the node arrival rate is not too high. Our simulation also
shows that the reputation based decision mechanism is not adversely affected by adding
the requirement that all new entrants be introduced. We also find that ROCQ copes with
the churn factor due to new peers without any impact on performance.
We find that uncooperative peers are prevented from entering the system by selective
introducers who refuse to introduce them. While naive peers do introduce new peers in the
system, they gradually lose their reputation as a result of making inaccurate introductions
and thus lose their ability to introduce new peers.
We note that as long as there are naive introducers, uncooperative peers will not be com-
pletely excluded from the system. Moreover, in our model even uncooperative peers are
full members of the system and have all rights including introducing new peers. However,
uncooperative peers never manage to raise their reputation beyond the threshold required
to recommend new peers. On the other hand, even though most interaction requests of
new cooperative peers are denied (as are those of new uncooperative peers), they gain pos-
itive feedback from the interaction requests that are accepted and gradually gain a high
reputation like other cooperative peers.
It is also instructive to note that our experiments assume a random assignment of intro-
ducers where new nodes have no control over who introduces them. This is the worst-case
scenario as a cooperative node may be routed to an uncooperative node or a node with low
reputation for introduction and thus be excluded from the network. In actual applications,
it is much more likely that new entrants be recommended by peers that are already known
to them.
5 Related Work
There has been much work on reputation management for trust and security and providing
incentives for cooperation in p2p systems. Some of these works have addressed the issue
of how to deal with new entrants to the P2P system. However, to our knowledge no one
has proposed lending reputation to new peers as a means of bootstrapping them.
Systems like BitTorrent [5] and SLIC [15] try to give nodes service levels proportional to
their contribution. In BitTorrent, nodes reserve R}NL of their bandwidth for serving nodes
that may not have uploaded anything to them. This serves to bootstrap the new nodes who
then have content which they can share with others.
Samsara [6] ensures fairness by forcing nodes to share as much storage space as they use
and challenging nodes periodically to prove that they are actually storing the data they
promise to store. Enforcing fairness in storage systems is easier as storage is a relatively
stable resource as opposed to bandwidth or computational power and a misbehaving node
can be punished by simply deleting its files. KARMA [16] and SeAl [13] track resource
usage through distributed auditing mechanisms that keep track of micro-credits.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a new mechanism for bootstrapping new peers that enter
a system that uses reputation management for incentivizing cooperation. By restriction
admission to peers that are introduced by current members of the system, we show that it
is possible to significantly reduce the number of uncooperative peers that enter the system.
Existing network members have dual objectives of increasing their own reputation and
maximizing system utility by increasing the number of peers in the system. By introduc-
ing new peers, they can fulfill both objectives as bringing a new cooperative peer in the
system earns a reward. Conversely, if an uncooperative peer is introduced, the introducer
is penalized.
While our current implementation is dependent on the existence of an underlying repu-
tation mechanism and a DHT-based routing protocol that uses score managers, the basic
concept of reputation lending can be extended to other situations as well.
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